The EC’21 tutorials are part of a much larger program that includes paper watch parties, virtual posters, tutorials, workshops, and more; the full EC’21 calendar can be viewed by clicking the button below.
To subscribe to the calendar or see events in your local time, click the “+Google Calendar” button in the lower-right corner of any of the above calendars.
To enter the virtual venue, click the button below:
- Please note that you must be using either Chrome or Firefox browsers on a computer, and that the use of personal devices such as cell phones and tablets is not supported.
- When signing on for the first time, please allow Gather to access your microphone and camera for the best experience.
- If you have any difficulties, please contact email@example.com.
Access the virtual venue via the link above. The virtual venue is open now, so you are welcome to test your access prior to the event.
Participants are encouraged to attend pre-recording sessions for the tutorials between June 28-July 1, as well as for the watch parties on July 19 where the tutors are on hand to answer questions during the live chat. All times are eastern.
|Tutors||Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Sahil Singla|
||Monday, June 28||10:00-10:45am, 11:00-11:45am, 12:00-12:45pm|
|Watch Party (Room A)
||Monday, July 19||10:00-10:45am, 11:00-11:45am, 12:00-12:45pm|
|Pre-recording, Part 1||Tuesday, June 29||10:00-10:45am, 11-11:45am|
|Pre-recording Discussion||Tuesday, June 29||12:00-1:00pm|
|Pre-recording, Part 2||Wednesday, June 30||10:00-10:45am, 11-11:45am|
|Watch Party, Part 1 (Room B)
||Monday, July 19||10:00-10:45am, 11-11:45am|
|Watch Party Discussion (Room B)
||Monday, July 19||12:00-1:00pm|
|Watch Party, Part 2 (Room B)
||Monday, July 19||3:00-3:45pm, 4-4:45pm|
Robust Auction Design (Room C)
This tutorial focuses on informationally robust auction design; that is, designing auctions to work well regardless of the bidders’ higher-order beliefs about their values. Informational robustness is desirable for running auctions in practice, since the real-world auctioneer is unlikely to have detailed knowledge of the informational environment; it also addresses the critiques of Bayesian mechanism design, such as the full-surplus extraction results of Cremer and McLean (1988), which are based on the premise that the designer has exact knowledge of the informational environment. We cover the main methodology and results, and contrast them with the earlier approaches to robust mechanism design (such as ex post implementation) and related topics such as robust predictions in games.
|Tutors||Ben Brooks, Songzi Du|
|Pre-recording, Part 1||Tuesday, June 29||1:30-2:15pm, 2:30-3:15pm|
|Pre-recording, Part 2||Wednesday, June 30||1:30-2:15pm, 2:30-3:15pm|
|Watch Party, Part 1 (Room C)
||Monday, July 19||10:00-10:45am, 11:00-11:45am|
|Watch Party, Part 2 (Room C)
||Monday, July 19||3:00-3:45pm, 4:00-5:10pm|
Fairness and Discrimination through the Dual Lens of Mechanism Design and Machine Learning (Room D + Lounge)
|Tutors||Jessie Finocchiaro, Edwin Lock, Faidra Monachou, Manish Raghanvan|
|Pre-recording, Part 1
||Thursday, July 1||10:00-11:00am, 11:15-12:15am|
|Pre-recording Exercise Session
||Thursday, July 1||12:30-1:30pm|
|Pre-recording, Part 2
||Thursday, July 1||2:30-3:30pm|
|Watch Party, Part 1 (Room D)
||Monday, July 19||10:30-11:30am|
|Watch party Exercise Session (Lounge)
||Monday, July 19||11:45am-12:45pm|
|Watch Party, Part 2 (Room D)
||Monday, July 19||3:00-4:00pm, 4:15-5:15pm|