Accepted Papers

Accepted papers:

M. Akbarpour; S. Kominers; S. Li; P. Milgrom: Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms
M. Ostrovsky: Choice Screen Auctions
D. Vu; P. Loiseau: Colonel Blotto Games with Favoritism: Competitions with Pre-allocations and Asymmetric Effectiveness
K. He; J. Libgober: Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications
S. Dobzinski; M. Feldman; U. Feige: Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?
N. Immorlica; B. Lucier; V. Manshadi; A. Wei: Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms
H. Aziz; F. Brandl: Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing
J. Ely; G. Georgiadis; S. Khorasani; L. Rayo: Optimal Feedback in Contests
H. De Oliveira; Y. Ishii; X. Lin: Robust Merging of Information
B. Peng; C. Papadimitriou: Public goods games in directed networks
S. Barocas; H. Heidari; J. Kleinberg; K. Levy: On Modeling Human Perceptions of Allocation Policies with Uncertain Outcomes
C. Cheng; W. Rosenbaum: Stable Matchings with Restricted Preferences: Structure and Complexity
I. Arieli; Y. Babichenko; M. Mueller-Frank: Sequential Naive Learning
J. Kim: Equilibrium Computation of Generalized Nash Games: A New Lagrangian-Based Approach
H. Aziz; Z. Sun: Multi-Rank Smart Reserves
K. Dasaratha; K. He: Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks
M. Backus; T. Blake; J. Pettus; S. Tadelis: Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis
A. Aznag; V. Goyal; N. Périvier: MNL-Bandit with Knapsacks
G. Aridor; T. Salz; Y. Che: The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR
M. Albach; J. Wright: The Role of Accuracy in Algorithmic Process Fairness Across Multiple Domains
Y. Deng; V. Mirrokni; S. Zuo: Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond
S. Agrawal; S. Yin; A. Zeevi: Learning to Price under the Bass Model for Dynamic Demand
Y. Jin; S. Jiang; P. Lu; H. Zhang: Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms
A. Blum; P. Gölz: Incentive-compatible kidney exchange in a slightly semi-random model
M. Sellke; A. Slivkins: The Price of Incentivizing Exploration: A Characterization via Thompson Sampling and Sample Complexity
A. Liang; X. Mu; V. Syrgkanis: Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information
P. Duetting; S. Lattanzi; R. Leme; S. Vassilvitskii: Secretaries with Advice
K. Munagala; Z. Shen; K. Wang: Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule
A. Deligkas; A. Filos-Ratsikas; A. Hollender: Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Consensus-Halving for a Constant Number of Agents
V. Manshadi; R. Niazadeh; S. Rodilitz: Fair Dynamic Rationing
X. Huang; P. Lu: An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation of Chores
A. Liang; D. Fudenberg; W. Gao: How Flexible is that Functional Form? Measuring the Restrictiveness of Theories
M. Kirneva; M. Núñez: Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes
I. Rios; D. Saban; F. Zheng: Improving Match Rates in Dating Markets Through Assortment Optimization
L. Sering; L. Koch; T. Ziemke: Convergence of a Packet Routing Model to Flows Over Time
A. Filos-Ratsikas; Y. Giannakopoulos; A. Hollender; P. Lazos; D. Poças: On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
G. Andrade; R. Frongillo; S. Srinivasan; E. Gorokhovsky: Graphical Economics with Resale
N. Arnosti; T. Randolph: Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation
A. Ban; A. Cohen; S. Dobzinski; I. Ashlagi: Simple Economies are Almost Optimal
A. Singh; J. Zhang; S. Veeraraghavan: Fulfillment by Platform: Antitrust and Upstream Market Power
S. Ahmadi; H. Beyhaghi; A. Blum; K. Naggita: The Strategic Perceptron
Z. Kang: Optimal Public Provision of Private Goods
J. Baek; V. Farias; A. Georgescu; R. Levi; T. Peng; D. Sinha; J. Wilde; A. Zheng: The Limits to Learning a Diffusion Model
J. Kleinberg; R. Kleinberg; S. Oren: Optimal Stopping with Behaviorally Biased Agents: The Role of Loss Aversion and Changing Reference Points
N. Haghpanah; A. Kuvalekar; E. Lipnowski: Selling to a Group
Y. Che; W. Zhong: Robustly-Optimal Mechanism for Selling Multiple Goods
R. Niazadeh; N. Golrezaei; J. Wang; F. Susan; A. Badanidiyuru: Online Learning via Offline Greedy Algorithms: Applications in Market Design and Optimization
A. Allouah; A. Bahamou; O. Besbes: Revenue Maximization from Finite Samples
M. Rossi: Quality Disclosures and Disappointment: Evidence from the Academy Awards
Y. Babichenko; I. Talgam-Cohen; H. Xu; K. Zabarnyi: Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion
T. Nguyen; R. Vohra: Delta-Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities
K. Sornat; V. Williams; Y. Xu: Fine-Grained Complexity and Algorithms for the Schulze Voting Method
D. Freund; J. Zhao: Overbooking with bounded loss
X. Chen; C. Kroer; R. Kumar: The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price Auctions
C. Thomas: Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is OSP Implementable
Y. Hu; Z. Huang; Y. Shen; X. Wang: Targeting Makes Sample Efficiency in Auction Design
Y. Lin; H. Nguyen; T. Nguyen; K. Altinkemer: Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints
K. Bimpikis; I. Morgenstern; D. Saban: Data Tracking under Competition
A. Braun; T. Kesselheim: Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities
Y. Deng; J. Hartline; J. Mao; B. Sivan: Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms
A. Allouah; A. Bahamou; O. Besbes: Optimal Pricing with a Single Point
D. Shishkin: Evidence Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure
R. Jagadeesan; A. Teytelboym: Matching and Money
I. Ashlagi; F. Monachou; A. Nikzad: Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design
S. He; B. Hollenbeck; D. Proserpio: The Market for Fake Reviews
S. Agrawal; E. Balkanski; V. Mirrokni; B. Sivan: Robust Repeated First Price Auctions
M. Ferreira; S. Weinberg: Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness
T. Roughgarden: Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559
L. Xia: How Likely Are Large Elections Tied?
N. Cesa-Bianchi; T. Cesari; R. Colomboni; F. Fusco; S. Leonardi: A Regret Analysis of Bilateral Trade
X. Wang; D. Pennock; N. Devanur; D. Rothschild; B. Tao; M. Wellman: Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market
Y. Zu; K. Iyer; H. Xu: Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance
A. Aouad; D. Saban: Online Assortment Optimization for Two-sided Matching Platforms
G. Liao; Y. Su; J. Ziani; A. Wierman; J. Huang: The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias-Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition
J. Cembrano; J. Correa; V. Verdugo: Multidimensional Apportionment through Discrepancy Theory
E. Neyman; G. Noarov; S. Weinberg: Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision
P. Kleer: Sampling from the Gibbs Distribution in Congestion Games
A. Liu; R. Leme; M. Pal; J. Schneider; B. Sivan: Variable Decomposition for Prophet Inequalities and Optimal Ordering
E. Neyman; T. Roughgarden: From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation
Y. Che; O. Tercieux: Optimal Queue Design
D. Paccagnan; M. Gairing: In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approximation
M. Jeloudar; I. Lo; A. Saberi; T. Pollner: Search Approximates Optimal Matching
M. Castiglioni; A. Marchesi; N. Gatti: Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable Contracts
M. Zhang: A Theory of Choice Bracketing under Risk
P. Papp; R. Wattenhofer: Debt Swapping for Risk Mitigation in Financial Networks
P. Pathak; T. Sönmez; M. Ünver; M. Yenmez: A General Theory of Reserve System Design with Application in Pandemic Medical Resource Allocation
Y. Cai; A. Oikonomou: On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items
B. Chaudhury; J. Garg; K. Mehlhorn; R. Mehta; P. Misra: Improving EFX Guarantees through Rainbow Cycle Number
E. Diana; T. Dick; H. Elzayn; M. Kearns; A. Roth; Z. Schutzman; S. Sharifi-Malvajerdi; J. Ziani: Algorithms and Learning for Fair Portfolio Design
L. Cai; R. Saxena: 99% Revenue with Constant Enhanced Competition
I. Caragiannis; P. Kanellopoulos; M. Kyropoulou: On Interim Envy-Free Allocation Lotteries
P. Dworczak; J. Li: Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated?
J. Gaitonde; J. Kleinberg; E. Tardos: Polarization in Geometric Opinion Dynamics
S. Balseiro; Y. Deng; J. Mao; V. Mirrokni; S. Zuo: The Landscape of Autobidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization
R. Frongillo; R. Gomez; A. Thilagar; B. Waggoner: Efficient Competitions and Online Learning with Strategic Forecasters
T. Alon; R. Lavi; E. Shamash; I. Talgam-Cohen: Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency
G. Guruganesh; J. Schneider; J. Wang: Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
V. Bosshard; S. Seuken: The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions
N. Chen; A. Li; S. Yang: Revenue Maximization and Learning in Products Ranking
J. Gaitonde; E. Tardos: Virtues of Patience in Strategic Queuing Systems
S. Zheng; F. Yu; Y. Chen: The Limits of Peer Prediction
R. Deb; A. Roesler: Multi-Dimensional Screening with Buyer-Optimal Learning
M. Pycia; K. Woodward: Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid
C. Papdimitriou; T. Pollner; A. Saberi; D. Wajc: Online Stochastic Max-Weight Bipartite Matching: Beyond Prophet Inequalities
D. Segev; S. Singla: Efficient Approximation Schemes for Stochastic Probing and Prophet Problems
A. Kambhampati: Robust Performance Evaluation
T. Alon; P. Duetting; I. Talgam-Cohen: Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort
N. Ahani; P. Goelz; A. Procaccia; A. Teytelboym; A. Trapp: Dynamic Placement in Refugee Resettlement
M. Beyeler; G. Brero; B. Lubin; S. Seuken: iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding
I. Arieli; F. Sandomirskiy; R. Smorodinsky: On social networks that support learning
A. Miralles; M. Pycia: Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources
D. Delacretaz: Processing Reserves Simultaneously
S. Alaei; A. Makhdoumi; A. Malekian: Revenue Maximization Under Unknown Private Values With Non-Obligatory Inspection
M. Braverman; J. Schneider; S. Weinberg: Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability
S. Liu; W. Shen; H. Xu: Optimal Pricing of Information
F. Ostrizek; D. Shishkin: Screening with Frames
P. Skowron: Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules
R. Kulkarni; R. Mehta; S. Taki: Indivisible Mixed Manna: On the Computability of MMS+PO allocations
M. Babaioff; T. Ezra; U. Feige: Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements
S. Brânzei; N. Devanur; Y. Rabani: Proportional Dynamics in Exchange Economies
S. Banerjee; A. Gorokh; K. Iyer: The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market
O. Candogan; P. Strack: Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver
X. Han; O. Kesten; M. Ünver: Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences
G. Farina; C. Kroer; T. Sandholm: Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: Fast Convergence Rates for Nash, Correlated, and Team Equilibria
S. Zheng; Y. Chen: Optimal Advertising for Information Products
V. Gkatzelis; E. Pountourakis; A. Sgouritsa: Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors
N. Golrezaei; V. Manshadi; J. Schneider; S. Sekar: Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users
C. Urgun; L. Yariv: Retrospective Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain
F. Brandl; F. Brandt; D. Peters; C. Stricker: Distribution Rules Under Dichotomous Preferences: Two Out of Three Ain’t Bad
L. Armona; G. Lewis; G. Zervas: Learning Product Characteristics and Consumer Preferences from Search Data