Main Program

Mentoring Workshop

EC Vignettes – CANCELLED

Contributed Poster Session 1 (Lobby)

Contributed Poster Session 2 (Lobby)

• Contextual Search in the Presence of Irrational Agents (Akshay Krishnamurthy, Thodoris Lykouris, Chara Podimata, Robert Schapire) (A2)
• Social Influence within clusters (Abhinash Borah, Raghvi Garg, Ojasvi Khare, Nitesh Kumar Singh) (C3)
• Noble Deceit: Optimizing Social Welfare for Myopic Multi-Armed Bandits (Jeremy McMahan, Ashwin Maran, and Nathaniel Sauerberg) (C1)
• Strategic Classification in the Dark (Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Itay Eilat, Nir Rosenfeld and Inbal Talgam-Cohen) (E1)
• Efficient Fiduciary Bandits (Omer Ben-Porat) (A3)
• Solving Structured Hierarchical Games Using Differential Backward Induction (Zun Li, Feiran Jia, Aditya Mate, Shahin Jabbari, Mithun Chakraborty, Milind Tambe, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik) (D3)
• Reverse auctions are different from auctions (Matthias Gerstgrasser) (D2)
• Tatonnement beyond Constant Elasticity of Substitution (Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Viqueira Areyan, Amy Greenwald) (E2)
• Equal Affection or Random Selection: the Quality of Subjective Feedback from a Group Perspective (Jiale Chen, Yuqing Kong, Yuxuan Lu) (B1)
• Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks (Martin Bichler, Max Fichtl, Stefan Heidekrüger, Nils Kohring, Paul Sutterer) (C2)
• Co-evolution of Opinion and Social Tie Dynamics Towards Structural Balance (Haotian Wang, Feng Luo, Jie Gao) (A1)
• Form of Misalignment and State-Pooling Structure in Bayesian Persuasion (Maxim Senkov, Rastislav Rehák) (B2)
• Geometric Methods for Finite Rational Inattention (Roc Armenter, Michèle Müller-Itten and Zachary Stangebye) (B3)
• The Platform Design Problem (Christos Papadimitriou, Kiran Vodrahalli, Mihalis Yannakakis) (E3)
• Persuading with Anecdotes (Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, Divyarthi Mohan) (D1)

Tutorial Watch Parties and Exercise Sessions, Part 1

• Prophet Inequalities and Implications to Pricing Mechanisms and Online Algorithms (Room A)
  Watch Party (10:00-10:45am, 11:00-11:45am, 12:00-12:45am)
  (10:30-11:15am, 11:30-12:15pm, 12:30-1:15pm)
• Designing Agents’ Preferences, Beliefs, and Identities (Room B)
  Watch Party, Part 1/2 (10:00-10:45am, 11-11:45am)
  Watch Party Discussion (12:00-1:00pm)
  Watch Party, Part 1/2 (10:30-11:15am, 11:30-12:15pm)
  Watch Party Discussion (12:30-1:30pm)
• Robust Auction Design (Room C)
  Watch Party, Part 1/2 (10:00-10:45am, 11:00-11:45am)
  Watch Party, Part 1/2 (10:30-11:15am, 11:30-12:15pm)
• Fairness and Discrimination through the Dual Lens of Mechanism Design and Machine Learning (Room D + Lounge)
  Watch Party, Part 1/2 (10:30-11:30am) (Room D)
  Watch Party Exercise Session (11:45am-12:45pm) (Lounge)

Social Event: EC Puzzle Hunt (Lounge)

Contributed Poster Session 3 (Lobby)

• Sponsor Poster: Facebook (A2)
• Fair Division of Indivisibles: On the Computability of Maximin Share (MMS) Allocations (Setareh Taki) (C1)
• Searching, Sorting, and Cake Cutting in Rounds (Simina Branzei, Dimitris Paparas, Nicholas Recker) (D2)
• On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms: A Converse of a Theorem of Hart and Nisan (Alex Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg) (C2)
• Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations (Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan) (B3)
• Stable Matching Games (Felipe Garrido-Lucero) (E1)
• An Axiomatic Theory of Provably-Fair Welfare-Centric Machine Learning (Cyrus Cousins) (A1)
• Three Results on Prophet Inequalities on (Hyper-) Graphs (Noga Alon, Tristan Pollner, S. Matthew Weinberg) (E3)
• The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets (Mohammad Akbarpour, Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Shengwu Li, Amin Saberi) (E2)
• Disinformation, Stochastic Harm, and Costly Filtering: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Regulating Social Media Platforms (Shehroze Khan and James R. Wright) (B2)
• On Symmetries and Fairness in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design (Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg) (C3)
• Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials (Shih-Tang Su, Vijay Subramanian, Grant Schoenebeck) (A3)
• Computing Simple Mechanisms via Marginal Reduced Form Relaxation (Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Mingfei Zhao) (B1)
• Selecting a Match: Exploration vs Decision (Ishan Agarwal) (D3)
• Optimal Learning for Structured Bandits (Bart Van Parys, Negin Golrezai) (D1)

Contributed Poster Session 4 (Lobby)

• Sponsor Poster: Google (A3)
• Optimal Scoring Rule Design (Fang-Yi Yu) (C2)
• Optimal Matchmaking in Two-sided Marketplaces (Peng Shi) (C1)
• Pricing Ordered Items (Shuchi Chawla, Rojin Rezvan, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos) (D1)
• Strategic Behavior is Bliss: Iterative Voting Improves Social Welfare (Joshua Kavner, Lirong Xia) (E1)
• Labor Cost Free-Riding in the Gig Economy (Zhen Lian, Sebastien Martin, Garrett van Ryzin) (B1)
• Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization via Promised Utilities (Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Artur Gorokh, Billy Jin) (B3)
• Dynamic Communication with Trading Commissions (Hargungeet Singh) (A1)
• Fairness and Bias in Online Selection (José Correa, Andrés Cristi, Paul Dütting, Ashkan Norouzi-Fard) (A2)
• Measurement Integrity in Peer Prediction: A Peer Assessment Case Study (Noah Burrell and Grant Schoenebeck) (B2)
• Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values (Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin) (D2)
• Randomized FIFO Mechanisms (Francisco Castro, Hongyao Ma, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Chiwei Yan) (D3)
• Two-sided Benefits of Price Transparency in Informal Supply Chains (Joann de Zegher, Irene Lo, Yuan Shi) (E2)
• Wisdom of the Crowd Voting: Truthful Aggregation of Voter Information and Preferences (Grant Schoenebeck and Biaoshuai Tao) (E3)

Tutorial Watch Parties and Exercise Sessions, Part 2

Contributed Poster Session 5 (Lobby)

• Online Resource Allocation with Time-Flexible Customers (Negin Golrezaei, Evan Yao) (D1)
• The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Congestion Games (Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden) (E2)
• Stateful Strategic Regression (Keegan Harris) (E1)
• Fair division of graphs and of tangled cakes (Ayumi Igarashi and William S. Zwicker) (B3)
• Securities Based Decision Markets (Wenlong Wang) (D3)
• Choice by Rejection (Kriti Manocha, Bhavook Bhardwaj) (A3)
• Optimal Pricing Schemes for an Impatient Buyer (Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan and Kangning Wang) (D2)
• Yield Optimization with Penalties and Surplus Supply (Melika Abolhassani, Hossein Esfandiari, Yasamin Nazari, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng, Creighton Thomas) (E3)
• A risk-sensitive approach to many-agent decision making (Takayuki Osogami) (A1)
• Interference, Bias, and Variance in Two-Sided Marketplace Experimentation: Guidance for Platforms (Hannah Li, Geng Zhao, Ramesh Johari, Gabriel Y. Weintraub) (C2)
• Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets with Application to Fair Division (Yuan Gao, Christian Kroer) (C1)
• Coexistence of Centralized and Decentralized Markets (Berk Idem) (B1)
• Equilibria in Auctions with Ad Types (Hadi Elzayn) (B2)
• Bidding and Pricing in Budget and ROI Constrained Markets (Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang, Vahan Mirrokni) (A2)
• Learning in Matrix Games can be Arbitrarily Complex (Gabriel P. Andrade, Rafael Frongillo, Georgios Piliouras) (C3)

Contributed Poster Session 2 (Lobby)

• Contextual Search in the Presence of Irrational Agents (Akshay Krishnamurthy, Thodoris Lykouris, Chara Podimata, Robert Schapire) (A2)
• Social Influence within clusters (Abhinash Borah, Raghvi Garg, Ojasvi Khare, Nitesh Kumar Singh) (C3)
• Noble Deceit: Optimizing Social Welfare for Myopic Multi-Armed Bandits (Jeremy McMahan, Ashwin Maran, and Nathaniel Sauerberg) (C1)
• Strategic Classification in the Dark (Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Itay Eilat, Nir Rosenfeld and Inbal Talgam-Cohen) (E1)
• Efficient Fiduciary Bandits (Omer Ben-Porat) (A3)
• Solving Structured Hierarchical Games Using Differential Backward Induction (Zun Li, Feiran Jia, Aditya Mate, Shahin Jabbari, Mithun Chakraborty, Milind Tambe, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik) (D3)
• Reverse auctions are different from auctions (Matthias Gerstgrasser) (D2)
• Tatonnement beyond Constant Elasticity of Substitution (Denizalp Goktas, Enrique Viqueira Areyan, Amy Greenwald) (E2)
• Equal Affection or Random Selection: the Quality of Subjective Feedback from a Group Perspective (Jiale Chen, Yuqing Kong, Yuxuan Lu) (B1)
• Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks (Martin Bichler, Max Fichtl, Stefan Heidekrüger, Nils Kohring, Paul Sutterer) (C2)
• Co-evolution of Opinion and Social Tie Dynamics Towards Structural Balance (Haotian Wang, Feng Luo, Jie Gao) (A1)
• Form of Misalignment and State-Pooling Structure in Bayesian Persuasion (Maxim Senkov, Rastislav Rehák) (B2)
• Geometric Methods for Finite Rational Inattention (Roc Armenter, Michèle Müller-Itten and Zachary Stangebye) (B3)
• The Platform Design Problem (Christos Papadimitriou, Kiran Vodrahalli, Mihalis Yannakakis) (E3)
• Persuading with Anecdotes (Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, Divyarthi Mohan) (D1)

International Replay Contributed Poster Session 1 (Lobby)

International Replay Contributed Poster Session 2 (Lobby)

• Contextual Search in the Presence of Irrational Agents (Akshay Krishnamurthy, Thodoris Lykouris, Chara Podimata, Robert Schapire) (A2)
• Guaranteeing Maximin Shares: Some Agents Left Behind (Hadi Hosseini and Andrew Searns) (C1)
• Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations (Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan) (B3)
• Test-optional Policies: Overcoming Strategic Behavior and Informational Gaps (Zhi Liu and Nikhil Garg) (E2)
• Noble Deceit: Optimizing Social Welfare for Myopic Multi-Armed Bandits (Jeremy McMahan, Ashwin Maran, and Nathaniel Sauerberg) (B2)
• Solving Structured Hierarchical Games Using Differential Backward Induction (Zun Li, Feiran Jia, Aditya Mate, Shahin Jabbari, Mithun Chakraborty, Milind Tambe, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik) (E1)
• Three Results on Prophet Inequalities on (Hyper-) Graphs (Noga Alon, Tristan Pollner, S. Matthew Weinberg) (E3)
• Efficient and Envy Minimal Matching (Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Aram Grigoryan) (A3)
• Co-evolution of Opinion and Social Tie Dynamics Towards Structural Balance (Haotian Wang, Feng Luo, Jie Gao) (A1)
• Equilibria in Auctions with Ad Types (Hadi Elzayn) (B1)
• Measurement Integrity in Peer Prediction: A Peer Assessment Case Study (Noah Burrell and Grant Schoenebeck) (C2)
• Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values (Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin) (D1)
• Randomized FIFO Mechanisms (Francisco Castro, Hongyao Ma, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Chiwei Yan) (D2)
• Selecting a Match: Exploration vs Decision (Ishan Agarwal) (D3)

Tutorial Watch Parties, Part 1

Social Event: EC Puzzle Hunt (Lounge)

International Replay Contributed Poster Session 3 (Lobby)

• Sponsor Poster: Google (B2)
• Fair division of graphs and of tangled cakes (Ayumi Igarashi and William S. Zwicker) (A3)
• Securities Based Decision Markets (Wenlong Wang) (E1)
• FIXP-membership via Convex Optimization: Games, Cakes, and Markets (Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Kasper Høgh, and Alexandros Hollender) (B1)
• Stable Matching Games (Felipe Garrido-Lucero) (E2)
• Social Influence within clusters (Abhinash Borah, Raghvi Garg, Ojasvi Khare, Nitesh Kumar Singh) (C3)
• Strategic Behavior is Bliss: Iterative Voting Improves Social Welfare (Joshua Kavner, Lirong Xia) (E3)
• Labor Cost Free-Riding in the Gig Economy (Zhen Lian, Sebastien Martin, Garrett van Ryzin) (C2)
• Interference, Bias, and Variance in Two-Sided Marketplace Experimentation: Guidance for Platforms (Hannah Li, Geng Zhao, Ramesh Johari, Gabriel Y. Weintraub) (C1)
• Equal Affection or Random Selection: the Quality of Subjective Feedback from a Group Perspective (Jiale Chen, Yuqing Kong, Yuxuan Lu) (A2)
• Infinite-Dimensional Fisher Markets with Application to Fair Division (Yuan Gao, Christian Kroer) (B3)
• Coexistence of Centralized and Decentralized Markets (Berk Idem) (A1)
• On Symmetries and Fairness in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design (Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg) (D1)
• Persuading with Anecdotes (Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, Divyarthi Mohan) (D3)
• Optimal Learning for Structured Bandits (Bart Van Parys, Negin Golrezai) (D2)

International Replay Contributed Poster Session 4 (Lobby)

• Online Resource Allocation with Time-Flexible Customers (Negin Golrezaei, Evan Yao) (C2)
• The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Congestion Games (Rahul Chandan, Dario Paccagnan, Jason R. Marden) (E1)
• Optimal Scoring Rule Design (Fang-Yi Yu) (D1)
• Optimal Matchmaking in Two-sided Marketplaces (Peng Shi) (C3)
• Pricing Ordered Items (Shuchi Chawla, Rojin Rezvan, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos) (D2)
• Yield Optimization with Penalties and Surplus Supply (Melika Abolhassani, Hossein Esfandiari, Yasamin Nazari, Balasubramanian Sivan, Yifeng Teng, Creighton Thomas) (E3)
• A risk-sensitive approach to many-agent decision making (Takayuki Osogami) (A1)
• On Online Traffic Routing: Deterministic Limits and Data-driven Enhancements (Devansh Jalota, Dario Paccagnan, Maximilian Schiffer, Marco Pavone) (B3)
• Reverse auctions are different from auctions (Matthias Gerstgrasser) (D3)
• Diversity and inequality in social networks (Ana-Andreea Stoica) (A3)
• Form of Misalignment and State-Pooling Structure in Bayesian Persuasion (Maxim Senkov, Rastislav Rehák) (B1)
• Geometric Methods for Finite Rational Inattention (Roc Armenter, Michèle Müller-Itten and Zachary Stangebye) (B2)
• On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and Correlation Gap (Chandra Chekuri and Vasilis Livanos) (C1)
• Charting the Type Space — The Case of Linear Public Good Experiments (Christoph Engel, Carina I. Hausladen, Marcel H. Schubert) (A2)
• Wisdom of the Crowd Voting: Truthful Aggregation of Voter Information and Preferences (Grant Schoenebeck and Biaoshuai Tao) (E2)

Tutorial Watch Parties Part 2

International Replay Contributed Poster Session 5 (Lobby)

• Sponsor Poster: Facebook (C3)
• Stateful Strategic Regression (Keegan Harris) (D3)
• Envy-freeness and Relaxed Stability for Lower Quotas (Girija Limaye) (C1)
• Choice by Rejection (Kriti Manocha, Bhavook Bhardwaj) (A3)
• Optimal and Stable Strategic Coopetition in Business Networks (Eitan Farchi, Segev Wasserkrug) (D1)
• Efficient Fiduciary Bandits (Omer Ben-Porat) (B3)
• The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets (Mohammad Akbarpour, Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Shengwu Li, Amin Saberi) (E1)
• (Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond) (Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman and Amos Fiat) (A1)
• Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks (Martin Bichler, Max Fichtl, Stefan Heidekrüger, Nils Kohring, Paul Sutterer) (C2)
• Two-Stage Facility Location Games with Strategic Clients and Facilities (Krogmann, Simon; Lenzner, Pascal; Molitor, Louise; Skopalik, Alexander) (E3)
• Square-Cut Pizza Sharing is PPA-complete (Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Themistoklis Melissourgos) (D2)
• Dynamic Communication with Trading Commissions (Hargungeet Singh) (B2)
• Computing Simple Mechanisms via Marginal Reduced Form Relaxation (Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Mingfei Zhao) (B1)
• Bidding and Pricing in Budget and ROI Constrained Markets (Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet, Jason Cheuk Nam Liang, Vahan Mirrokni) (A2)
• Two-sided Benefits of Price Transparency in Informal Supply Chains (Joann de Zegher, Irene Lo, Yuan Shi) (E2)

Social Event: Speed Networking (Lounge)

Contributed Poster Session 1 (Lobby)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 10:00 AM)

Dynamic mechanism design (Room A)

• Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond (Y. Deng; V. Mirrokni; S. Zuo)
• Fair Dynamic Rationing (V. Manshadi; R. Niazadeh; S. Rodilitz)
• Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability (M. Braverman; J. Schneider; S. Weinberg)

Chair: Shuchi Chawla

Prophet inequalities (Room B)

• Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities (A. Braun; T. Kesselheim)
• Variable Decomposition for Prophet Inequalities and Optimal Ordering (A. Liu; R. Leme; M. Pal; J. Schneider; B. Sivan)
• Efficient Approximation Schemes for Stochastic Probing and Prophet Problems (D. Segev; S. Singla)

Chair: Matt Weinberg

Matching and reserves (Room C)

• Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing (H. Aziz; F. Brandl)
• Multi-Rank Smart Reserves (H. Aziz; Z. Sun)
• A General Theory of Reserve System Design with Application in Pandemic Medical Resource Allocation (P. Pathak; T. Sönmez; M. Ünver; M. Yenmez)

Chair: Alex Westkamp

Learning (Room D)

• The Limits to Learning a Diffusion Model (J. Baek; V. Farias; A. Georgescu; R. Levi; T. Peng; D. Sinha; J. Wilde; A. Zheng)
• Learning Product Characteristics and Consumer Preferences from Search Data (L. Armona; G. Lewis; G. Zervas)
• Sequential Naive Learning (I. Arieli; Y. Babichenko; M. Mueller-Frank)

Modeling behavior (Room E)

• On Modeling Human Perceptions of Allocation Policies with Uncertain Outcomes (S. Barocas, H. Heidari, J. Kleinberg, K. Levy)
• Robust Merging of Information (H. De Oliveira; Y. Ishii; X. Lin)
• Optimal Stopping with Behaviorally Biased Agents: The Role of Loss Aversion and Changing Reference Points (J. Kleinberg; R. Kleinberg; S. Oren)

Chair: James Wright

Keynote talk by Leeat Yariv (Plenary Room)
Disentangling Exploration from Exploitation

Chair: Shuchi Chawla

Social Event: Junior/Senior Tables (Lounge)

Break

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 1:30PM)

Auctions (Room A)

• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid (M. Pycia; K. Woodward)
• Robust Repeated First Price Auctions (S. Agrawal; E. Balkanski; V. Mirrokni; B. Sivan)
• Revenue Maximization Under Unknown Private Values With Non-Obligatory Inspection (S. Alaei; A. Makhdoumi; a. malekian)

Chair: Yang Cai

Game Theory (Room B)

• Colonel Blotto Games with Favoritism: Competitions with Pre-allocations and Asymmetric Effectiveness (D. Vu; P. Loiseau)
• Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors (V. Gkatzelis; E. Pountourakis; A. Sgouritsa)
• Optimal Feedback in Contests (J. Ely; G. Georgiadis; S. Khorasani; L. Rayo)

Chair: Ruta Mehta

Social networks (Room C)

• Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks (K. Dasaratha; K. He)
• Polarization in Geometric Opinion Dynamics (J. Gaitonde; J. Kleinberg; E. Tardos)
• On social networks that support learning (I. Arieli; F. Sandomirskiy; R. Smorodinsky)

Chair: Amin Rahimian

Peer prediction and scoring rules (Room D)

• Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision (E. Neyman; G. Noarov; S. Weinberg)
• From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation (E. Neyman; T. Roughgarden)
• The Limits of Peer Prediction (S. Zheng; F. Yu; Y. Chen)

Chair: Drew Fudenberg

Fair allocation (Room E)

• Improving EFX Guarantees through Rainbow Cycle Number (B. Chaudhury; J. Garg; K. Mehlhorn; R. Mehta; P. Misra)
• On Interim Envy-Free Allocation Lotteries (I. Caragiannis; P. Kanellopoulos; M. Kyropoulou)
• Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements (M. Babaioff; T. Ezra; U. Feige)

Chair: Aris Filos-Ratsikas

Test of Time Award (Plenary Room)

Chair: Larry Samuelson

SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award (Plenary Room)

Chair: Sigal Oren

Break and Social Event: Speed Networking (Lounge)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 5:00 PM)

Revenue maximization (Room A)

• Revenue Maximization from Finite Samples (A. Allouah; A. Bahamou; O. Besbes)
• Robustly-Optimal Mechanism for Selling Multiple Goods (Y. Che; W. Zhong)
• 99% Revenue with Constant Enhanced Competition (L. Cai; R. Saxena)

Chair: Nima Haghpanah

Auctions (Room B)

• The Landscape of Autobidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization (S. Balseiro; Y. Deng; J. Mao; V. Mirrokni; S. Zuo)
• Optimal Advertising for Information Products (S. Zheng; Y. Chen)
• Robust Performance Evaluation (A. Kambhampati)

Chair: Matthias Gerstgrasser

Market design (Room C)

• Dynamic Placement in Refugee Resettlement (N. Ahani; P. Gölz; A. Procaccia; A. Teytelboym; A. Trapp)
• Processing Reserves Simultaneously (D. Delacretaz)
• Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences (X. Han; O. Kesten; M. Ünver)

Chair: Irene Lo

Information elicitation (Room D)

• Data Tracking under Competition (K. Bimpikis; I. Morgenstern; D. Saban)
• Efficient Competitions and Online Learning with Strategic Forecasters (R. Frongillo; R. Gomez; A. Thilagar; B. Waggoner)
• Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information (A. Liang; X. Mu; V. Syrgkanis)

Chair: Ali Makhdoumi

Voting theory (Room E)

• Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule (K. Munagala; Z. Shen; K. Wang)
• Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes (M. Kirneva; M. Núñez)
• How Likely Are Large Elections Tied? (L. Xia)

Chair: Reshef Meir

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 10:00 PM)

Dynamic mechanism design (Room A)

• Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond (Y. Deng; V. Mirrokni; S. Zuo)
• Fair Dynamic Rationing (V. Manshadi; R. Niazadeh; S. Rodilitz)
• Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability (M. Braverman; J. Schneider; S. Weinberg)

Prophet inequalities (Room B)

• Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities (A. Braun; T. Kesselheim)
• Variable Decomposition for Prophet Inequalities and Optimal Ordering (A. Liu; R. Leme; M. Pal; J. Schneider; B. Sivan)
• Efficient Approximation Schemes for Stochastic Probing and Prophet Problems (D. Segev; S. Singla)

Matching and reserves (Room C)

• Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing (H. Aziz; F. Brandl)
• Multi-Rank Smart Reserves (H. Aziz; Z. Sun)
• A General Theory of Reserve System Design with Application in Pandemic Medical Resource Allocation (P. Pathak; T. Sönmez; M. Ünver; M. Yenmez)

Learning (Room D)

• The Limits to Learning a Diffusion Model (J. Baek; V. Farias; A. Georgescu; R. Levi; T. Peng; D. Sinha; J. Wilde; A. Zheng)
• Learning Product Characteristics and Consumer Preferences from Search Data (L. Armona; G. Lewis; G. Zervas)
• Sequential Naive Learning (I. Arieli; Y. Babichenko; M. Mueller-Frank)

Modeling behavior (Room E)

• On Modeling Human Perceptions of Allocation Policies with Uncertain Outcomes (S. Barocas, H. Heidari, J. Kleinberg, K. Levy)
• Robust Merging of Information (H. De Oliveira; Y. Ishii; X. Lin)
• Optimal Stopping with Behaviorally Biased Agents: The Role of Loss Aversion and Changing Reference Points (J. Kleinberg; R. Kleinberg; S. Oren)

Keynote talk by Leeat Yariv (Plenary Room)
Disentangling Exploration from Exploitation

Social Event: Junior/Senior Tables (Lounge)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 1:30AM)

Auctions (Room A)

• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid (M. Pycia; K. Woodward)
• Robust Repeated First Price Auctions (S. Agrawal; E. Balkanski; V. Mirrokni; B. Sivan)
• Revenue Maximization Under Unknown Private Values With Non-Obligatory Inspection (S. Alaei; A. Makhdoumi; a. malekian)

Game Theory (Room B)

• Colonel Blotto Games with Favoritism: Competitions with Pre-allocations and Asymmetric Effectiveness (D. Vu; P. Loiseau)
• Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors (V. Gkatzelis; E. Pountourakis; A. Sgouritsa)
• Optimal Feedback in Contests (J. Ely; G. Georgiadis; S. Khorasani; L. Rayo)

Social networks (Room C)

• Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks (K. Dasaratha; K. He)
• Polarization in Geometric Opinion Dynamics (J. Gaitonde; J. Kleinberg; E. Tardos)
• On social networks that support learning (I. Arieli; F. Sandomirskiy; R. Smorodinsky)

Peer prediction and scoring rules (Room D)

• Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision (E. Neyman; G. Noarov; S. Weinberg)
• From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation (E. Neyman; T. Roughgarden)
• The Limits of Peer Prediction (S. Zheng; F. Yu; Y. Chen)

Fair allocation (Room E)

• Improving EFX Guarantees through Rainbow Cycle Number (B. Chaudhury; J. Garg; K. Mehlhorn; R. Mehta; P. Misra)
• On Interim Envy-Free Allocation Lotteries (I. Caragiannis; P. Kanellopoulos; M. Kyropoulou)
• Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements (M. Babaioff; T. Ezra; U. Feige)

Test of Time Award (Plenary Room)

SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award (Plenary Room)

Break and Social Event: Speed Networking (Lounge)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 5:00 AM)

Revenue maximization (Room A)

• Revenue Maximization from Finite Samples (A. Allouah; A. Bahamou; O. Besbes)
• Robustly-Optimal Mechanism for Selling Multiple Goods (Y. Che; W. Zhong)
• 99% Revenue with Constant Enhanced Competition (L. Cai; R. Saxena)

Auctions (Room B)

• The Landscape of Autobidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization (S. Balseiro; Y. Deng; J. Mao; V. Mirrokni; S. Zuo)
• Optimal Advertising for Information Products (S. Zheng; Y. Chen)
• Robust Performance Evaluation (A. Kambhampati)

Market design (Room C)

• Dynamic Placement in Refugee Resettlement (N. Ahani; P. Gölz; A. Procaccia; A. Teytelboym; A. Trapp)
• Processing Reserves Simultaneously (D. Delacretaz)
• Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences (X. Han; O. Kesten; M. Ünver)

Information elicitation (Room D)

• Data Tracking under Competition (K. Bimpikis; I. Morgenstern; D. Saban)
• Efficient Competitions and Online Learning with Strategic Forecasters (R. Frongillo; R. Gomez; A. Thilagar; B. Waggoner)
• Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information (A. Liang; X. Mu; V. Syrgkanis)

Voting theory (Room E)

• Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule (K. Munagala; Z. Shen; K. Wang)
• Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes (M. Kirneva; M. Núñez)
• How Likely Are Large Elections Tied? (L. Xia)

Chair: Felix Brandt

Social Event: Diversity Meeting (Lounge)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 10:00 AM)

Mechanism design (Room A)

• Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms (M. Akbarpour; S. Kominers; S. Li; P. Milgrom)
• Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? (S. Dobzinski; M. Feldman; U. Feige)
• Incentive-compatible kidney exchange in a slightly semi-random model (A. Blum; P. Gölz)

Chair: Sam Taggart

Mechanism design and learning (Room B)

• iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding (M. Beyeler; G. Brero; B. Lubin; S. Seuken)
• The Price of Incentivizing Exploration: A Characterization via Thompson Sampling and Sample Complexity (M. Sellke; A. Slivkins)
• A Regret Analysis of Bilateral Trade (N. Cesa-Bianchi; T. Cesari; R. Colomboni; F. Fusco; S. Leonardi)

Chair: Renato Paes Leme

Complexity of equilibria (Room C)

• Equilibrium Computation of Generalized Nash Games: A New Lagrangian-Based Approach (J. Kim)
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions (A. Filos-Ratsikas; Y. Giannakopoulos; A. Hollender; P. Lazos; D. Poças)
• The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price Auctions (X. Chen; C. Kroer; R. Kumar)

Chair: Ruta Mehta

Data and online matching (Room D)

• MNL-Bandit with Knapsacks (A. Aznag; V. Goyal; N. Périvier)
• The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias-Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition (G. Liao; Y. Su; J. Ziani; A. Wierman; J. Huang)
• Online Stochastic Max-Weight Bipartite Matching: Beyond Prophet Inequalities (C. Papdimitriou; T. Pollner; A. Saberi; D. Wajc)

Chair: Sahil Singla

Social choice and voting theory (Room E)

• An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation of Chores (X. Huang; P. Lu)
• Fine-Grained Complexity and Algorithms for the Schulze Voting Method (K. Sornat; V. Williams; Y. Xu)
• Multidimensional Apportionment through Discrepancy Theory (J. Cembrano; J. Correa; V. Verdugo)

Chair: Felix Brandt

Business Meeting (Plenary Room)

Break

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 1:30PM)

Simplicity versus optimality (Room A)

• On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items (Y. Cai; A. Oikonomou)
• Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated? (P. Dworczak; J. Li)
• Simple Economies are Almost Optimal (A. Ban; A. Cohen; S. Dobzinski; I. Ashlagi)

Chair: Matt Weinberg

Pricing information (Room B)

• Evidence Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure (D. Shishkin)
• Optimal Pricing of Information (S. Liu; W. Shen; H. Xu)
• Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver (O. Candogan; P. Strack)

Chair: Renato Paes Leme

Market design (Room C)

• Matching and Money (R. Jagadeesan; A. Teytelboym)
• Optimal Queue Design (Y. Che; o. Tercieux)
• Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources (A. Miralles; M. Pycia)

Chair: Daniel Freund

Dynamics and games (Room D)

• Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications (K. He; J. Libgober)
• Virtues of Patience in Strategic Queuing Systems (J. Gaitonde; E. Tardos)
• Retrospective Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain (C. Urgun; L. Yariv)

Chair: Drew Fudenberg

Social choice (Room E)

• Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Consensus-Halving for a Constant Number of Agents (A. Deligkas; A. Filos-Ratsikas; A. Hollender)
• Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules (P. Skowron)
• Distribution Rules Under Dichotomous Preferences: Two Out of Three Ain’t Bad (F. Brandl; F. Brandt; D. Peters; C. Stricker)

Chair: Reshef Meir

Highlights Beyond EC 1 (Plenary Room)

• No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium
  Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti
  
• Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior
  Modibo Camara, Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen

Session Chair: Eva Tardos

Break and Social Event: Econ vs. CS Face-off (Lounge)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 5:00 PM)

Market design (Room A)

• Indivisible Mixed Manna: On the Computability of MMS+PO allocations (R. Kulkarni; R. Mehta; S. Taki)
• The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market (S. Banerjee; A. Gorokh; K. Iyer)
• Selling to a Group (N. Haghpanah; A. Kuvalekar; E. Lipnowski)

Chair: Laura Doval

Mechanism design and learning (Room B)

• Secretaries with Advice (P. Duetting; S. Lattanzi; R. Leme; S. Vassilvitskii)
• The Strategic Perceptron (S. Ahmadi; H. Beyhaghi; A. Blum; K. Naggita)
• Online Learning via Offline Greedy Algorithms: Applications in Market Design and Optimization (R. Niazadeh; N. Golrezaei; J. Wang; F. Susan; A. Badanidiyuru)

Chair: Daniela Saban

Market design (Room C)

• Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation (N. Arnosti; T. Randolph)
• Overbooking with bounded loss (D. Freund; J. Zhao)
• Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market (X. Wang; D. Pennock; N. Devanur; D. Rothschild; B. Tao; M. Wellman)

Platform markets (Room D)

• Fulfillment by Platform: Antitrust and Upstream Market Power (A. Singh; J. Zhang; S. Veeraraghavan)
• The Market for Fake Reviews (S. He; B. Hollenbeck; D. Proserpio)
• Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users (N. Golrezaei; V. Manshadi; J. Schneider; S. Sekar)

Chair: Kevin He

Behavioral economics (Room E)

• Quality Disclosures and Disappointment: Evidence from the Academy Awards (M. Rossi)
• Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is OSP Implementable (C. Thomas)
• A Theory of Choice Bracketing under Risk (M. Zhang)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 10:00 AM)

Mechanism design (Room A)

• Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms (M. Akbarpour; S. Kominers; S. Li; P. Milgrom)
• Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? (S. Dobzinski; M. Feldman; U. Feige)
• Incentive-compatible kidney exchange in a slightly semi-random model (A. Blum; P. Gölz)

Mechanism design and learning (Room B)

• iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding (M. Beyeler; G. Brero; B. Lubin; S. Seuken)
• The Price of Incentivizing Exploration: A Characterization via Thompson Sampling and Sample Complexity (M. Sellke; A. Slivkins)
• A Regret Analysis of Bilateral Trade (N. Cesa-Bianchi; T. Cesari; R. Colomboni; F. Fusco; S. Leonardi)

Complexity of equilibria (Room C)

• Equilibrium Computation of Generalized Nash Games: A New Lagrangian-Based Approach (J. Kim)
• On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions (A. Filos-Ratsikas; Y. Giannakopoulos; A. Hollender; P. Lazos; D. Poças)
• The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price Auctions (X. Chen; C. Kroer; R. Kumar)

Data and online matching (Room D)

• MNL-Bandit with Knapsacks (A. Aznag; V. Goyal; N. Périvier)
• The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias-Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition (G. Liao; Y. Su; J. Ziani; A. Wierman; J. Huang)
• Online Stochastic Max-Weight Bipartite Matching: Beyond Prophet Inequalities (C. Papdimitriou; T. Pollner; A. Saberi; D. Wajc)

Social choice and voting theory (Room E)

• An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation of Chores (X. Huang; P. Lu)
• Fine-Grained Complexity and Algorithms for the Schulze Voting Method (K. Sornat; V. Williams; Y. Xu)
• Multidimensional Apportionment through Discrepancy Theory (J. Cembrano; J. Correa; V. Verdugo)

Business Meeting (Plenary Room)

Break and Social Event: Diversity Meeting (Lounge)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 1:30PM)

Simplicity versus optimality (Room A)

• On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items (Y. Cai; A. Oikonomou)
• Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated? (P. Dworczak; J. Li)
• Simple Economies are Almost Optimal (A. Ban; A. Cohen; S. Dobzinski; I. Ashlagi)

Pricing information (Room B)

• Evidence Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure (D. Shishkin)
• Optimal Pricing of Information (S. Liu; W. Shen; H. Xu)
• Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver (O. Candogan; P. Strack)

Market design (Room C)

• Matching and Money (R. Jagadeesan; A. Teytelboym)
• Optimal Queue Design (Y. Che; o. Tercieux)
• Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources (A. Miralles; M. Pycia)

Dynamics and games (Room D)

• Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications (K. He; J. Libgober)
• Virtues of Patience in Strategic Queuing Systems (J. Gaitonde; E. Tardos)
• Retrospective Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain (C. Urgun; L. Yariv)

Social choice (Room E)

• Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Consensus-Halving for a Constant Number of Agents (A. Deligkas; A. Filos-Ratsikas; A. Hollender)
• Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules (P. Skowron)
• Distribution Rules Under Dichotomous Preferences: Two Out of Three Ain’t Bad (F. Brandl; F. Brandt; D. Peters; C. Stricker)

Highlights Beyond EC 1 (Plenary Room)

• No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium
  Andrea Celli, Alberto Marchesi, Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti
  
• Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior
  Modibo Camara, Jason Hartline, Aleck Johnsen

Break and Social Event: Junior/Senior Tables (Lounge)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 5:00 AM)

Market design (Room A)

• Indivisible Mixed Manna: On the Computability of MMS+PO allocations (R. Kulkarni; R. Mehta; S. Taki)
• The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market (S. Banerjee; A. Gorokh; K. Iyer)
• Selling to a Group (N. Haghpanah; A. Kuvalekar; E. Lipnowski)

Mechanism design and learning (Room B)

• Secretaries with Advice (P. Duetting; S. Lattanzi; R. Leme; S. Vassilvitskii)
• The Strategic Perceptron (S. Ahmadi; H. Beyhaghi; A. Blum; K. Naggita)
• Online Learning via Offline Greedy Algorithms: Applications in Market Design and Optimization (R. Niazadeh; N. Golrezaei; J. Wang; F. Susan; A. Badanidiyuru)

Market design (Room C)

• Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation (N. Arnosti; T. Randolph)
• Overbooking with bounded loss (D. Freund; J. Zhao)
• Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market (X. Wang; D. Pennock; N. Devanur; D. Rothschild; B. Tao; M. Wellman)

Platform markets (Room D)

• Fulfillment by Platform: Antitrust and Upstream Market Power (A. Singh; J. Zhang; S. Veeraraghavan)
• The Market for Fake Reviews (S. He; B. Hollenbeck; D. Proserpio)
• Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users (N. Golrezaei; V. Manshadi; J. Schneider; S. Sekar)

Behavioral economics (Room E)

• Quality Disclosures and Disappointment: Evidence from the Academy Awards (M. Rossi)
• Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is OSP Implementable (C. Thomas)
• A Theory of Choice Bracketing under Risk (M. Zhang)

Social Event: Junior/Senior Tables (Lounge)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 10:00 AM)

Mechanism design (Room A)

• Screening with Frames (F. Ostrizek; D. Shishkin)
• The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions (V. Bosshard; S. Seuken)
• Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness (R. Deb; A. Roesler)

Chair: Sebastien Lahaie

Mechanism design and learning (Room B)

• Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms (Y. Jin; S. Jiang; P. Lu; H. Zhang)
• Targeting Makes Sample Efficiency in Auction Design (Y. Hu; Z. Huang; Y. Shen; X. Wang)
• Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance (Y. Zu; K. Iyer; H. Xu)

Chair: Nima Haghpanah

Matching markets (Room C)

• Stable Matchings with Restricted Preferences: Structure and Complexity (C. Cheng; W. Rosenbaum)
• Delta-Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities (T. Nguyen; R. Vohra)
• Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints (Y. Lin; H. Nguyen; T. Nguyen; K. Altinkemer)

Chair: Haris Aziz

Platform markets (Room D)

• Improving Match Rates in Dating Markets Through Assortment Optimization (I. Rios; D. Saban; F. Zheng)
• Online Assortment Optimization for Two-sided Matching Platforms (A. Aouad; D. Saban)
• Revenue Maximization and Learning in Products Ranking (N. Chen; A. Li; S. Yang)

Chair: Will Ma

Privacy and fairness (Room E)

• The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR (G. Aridor, Y. Che, T. Salz)
• The Role of Accuracy in Algorithmic Process Fairness Across Multiple Domains (M. Albach, J. Wright)
• Algorithms and Learning for Fair Portfolio Design (E. Diana, T. Dick, H. Elzayn, M. Kearns, A. Roth, Z. Schutzman, S. Sharifi-Malvajerdi, J. Ziani)

Chair: Yuqing Kong

Keynote talk by Ashish Goel (Plenary Room)
Research Directions in Deliberative and Participatory Democracy

Chair: Federico Echenique

Break and Social Event: The Coauthor Wars (Lounge)

Break

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 1:30 PM)

Mechanism design and pricing (Room A)

• Optimal Public Provision of Private Goods (Z. Kang)
• Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms (Y. Deng; J. Hartline; J. Mao; B. Sivan)
• Optimal Pricing with a Single Point (A. Allouah; A. Bahamou; O. Besbes)

Chair: Laura Doval

Congestion games (Room B)

• Sampling from the Gibbs Distribution in Congestion Games (P. Kleer)
• In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approximation (D. Paccagnan; M. Gairing)
• Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: Fast Convergence Rates for Nash, Correlated, and Team Equilibria (G. Farina; C. Kroer; T. Sandholm)

Matching markets (Room C)

• Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms (N. Immorlica; B. Lucier; V. Manshadi; A. Wei)
• Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design (I. Ashlagi; F. Monachou; A. Nikzad)
• Decentralized Matching in a Probabilistic Environment (M. Jeloudar; I. Lo; A. Saberi; T. Pollner)

Chair: Daniela Saban

Behavioral models (Room D)

• Learning to Price under the Bass Model for Dynamic Demand (S. Agrawal; S. Yin; A. Zeevi)
• How Flexible is that Functional Form? Measuring the Restrictiveness of Theories (D. Fudenberg; W. Gao; A. Liang)
• Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion (Y. Babichenko; I. Talgam-Cohen; H. Xu; K. Zabarnyi)

Chair: James Wright

Cryptocurrencies (Room E)

• Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness (M. Ferreira; S. Weinberg)
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 (T. Roughgarden)
• Debt Swapping for Risk Mitigation in Financial Networks (P. Papp; R. Wattenhofer)

Highlights Beyond EC 2 (Plenary Room)

• Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture
  Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah
  
• Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System
  Gur Huberman, Jacob D. Leshno, Ciamac Moallemi

Session Chair: Yiling Chen

Break and Social Event: Hosted Conversations (Lounge)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 5:00 PM)

Contract theory (Room A)

• Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency (T. Alon; R. Lavi; E. Shamash; I. Talgam-Cohen)
• Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort (T. Alon; P. Duetting; I. Talgam-Cohen)
• Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (G. Guruganesh; J. Schneider; J. Wang) and Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable Contracts (M. Castiglioni; A. Marchesi; N. Gatti)

Chair: Yang Cai

Networks and equilibrium (Room B)

• Convergence of a Packet Routing Model to Flows Over Time (L. Sering; L. Koch; T. Ziemke)
• Public goods games in directed networks (B. Peng; C. Papadimitriou)

Chair: Yakov Babichenko

Market equilibria (Room C)

• Graphical Economics with Resale (G. Andrade; R. Frongillo; S. Srinivasan; E. Gorokhovsky)
• Proportional Dynamics in Exchange Economies (S. Brânzei; N. Devanur; Y. Rabani)

Chair: Richard Cole

Mechanisms and bargaining (Room D)

• Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis (M. Backus; T. Blake; J. Pettus; S. Tadelis)
• Choice Screen Auctions (M. Ostrovsky)

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 10:00 PM)

Mechanism design (Room A)

• Screening with Frames (F. Ostrizek; D. Shishkin)
• The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions (V. Bosshard; S. Seuken)
• Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness (R. Deb; A. Roesler)

Mechanism design and learning (Room B)

• Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms (Y. Jin; S. Jiang; P. Lu; H. Zhang)
• Targeting Makes Sample Efficiency in Auction Design (Y. Hu; Z. Huang; Y. Shen; X. Wang)
• Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance (Y. Zu; K. Iyer; H. Xu)

Matching markets (Room C)

• Stable Matchings with Restricted Preferences: Structure and Complexity (C. Cheng; W. Rosenbaum)
• Delta-Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities (T. Nguyen; R. Vohra)
• Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints (Y. Lin; H. Nguyen; T. Nguyen; K. Altinkemer)

Platform markets (Room D)

• Improving Match Rates in Dating Markets Through Assortment Optimization (I. Rios; D. Saban; F. Zheng)
• Online Assortment Optimization for Two-sided Matching Platforms (A. Aouad; D. Saban)
• Revenue Maximization and Learning in Products Ranking (N. Chen; A. Li; S. Yang)

Privacy and fairness (Room E)

• The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR (G. Aridor, Y. Che, T. Salz)
• The Role of Accuracy in Algorithmic Process Fairness Across Multiple Domains (M. Albach, J. Wright)
• Algorithms and Learning for Fair Portfolio Design (E. Diana, T. Dick, H. Elzayn, M. Kearns, A. Roth, Z. Schutzman, S. Sharifi-Malvajerdi, J. Ziani)

Keynote talk by Ashish Goel (Plenary Room)
Research Directions in Deliberative and Participatory Democracy

Break and Social Event: Board Games (Lounge)

Break

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 1:30 AM)

Mechanism design and pricing (Room A)

• Optimal Public Provision of Private Goods (Z. Kang)
• Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms (Y. Deng; J. Hartline; J. Mao; B. Sivan)
• Optimal Pricing with a Single Point (A. Allouah; A. Bahamou; O. Besbes)

Congestion games (Room B)

• Sampling from the Gibbs Distribution in Congestion Games (P. Kleer)
• In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approximation (D. Paccagnan; M. Gairing)
• Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: Fast Convergence Rates for Nash, Correlated, and Team Equilibria (G. Farina; C. Kroer; T. Sandholm)

Matching markets (Room C)

• Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms (N. Immorlica; B. Lucier; V. Manshadi; A. Wei)
• Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design (I. Ashlagi; F. Monachou; A. Nikzad)
• Decentralized Matching in a Probabilistic Environment (M. Jeloudar; I. Lo; A. Saberi; T. Pollner)

Behavioral models (Room D)

• Learning to Price under the Bass Model for Dynamic Demand (S. Agrawal; S. Yin; A. Zeevi)
• How Flexible is that Functional Form? Measuring the Restrictiveness of Theories (D. Fudenberg; W. Gao; A. Liang)
• Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion (Y. Babichenko; I. Talgam-Cohen; H. Xu; K. Zabarnyi)

Cryptocurrencies (Room E)

• Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness (M. Ferreira; S. Weinberg)
• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559 (T. Roughgarden)
• Debt Swapping for Risk Mitigation in Financial Networks (P. Papp; R. Wattenhofer)

Highlights Beyond EC 2 (Plenary Room)

• Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture
  Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah
  
• Monopoly without a Monopolist: An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System
  Gur Huberman, Jacob D. Leshno, Ciamac Moallemi

Break and Social Event: Hosted Conversation (Lounge) – CANCELLED

(5 parallel watch parties followed by plenary poster sessions at 5:00 AM)

Contract theory (Room A)

• Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency (T. Alon; R. Lavi; E. Shamash; I. Talgam-Cohen)
• Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort (T. Alon; P. Duetting; I. Talgam-Cohen)
• Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (G. Guruganesh; J. Schneider; J. Wang) and Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable Contracts (M. Castiglioni; A. Marchesi; N. Gatti)

Networks and equilibrium (Room B)

• Convergence of a Packet Routing Model to Flows Over Time (L. Sering; L. Koch; T. Ziemke)
• Public goods games in directed networks (B. Peng; C. Papadimitriou)

Market equilibria (Room C)

• Graphical Economics with Resale (G. Andrade; R. Frongillo; S. Srinivasan; E. Gorokhovsky)
• Proportional Dynamics in Exchange Economies (S. Brânzei; N. Devanur; Y. Rabani)

Mechanisms and bargaining (Room D)

• Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis (M. Backus; T. Blake; J. Pettus; S. Tadelis)
• Choice Screen Auctions (M. Ostrovsky)

Workshop on Fair Resource Allocation: Concepts, Algorithms and Complexity (FaiRACAC) (Room C)

Organizers: Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris

INFORMS Market Design Workshop (Room D)

Organizers: Saša Pekec, Martin Bichler, Alex Teytelboym

NetEcon 2021 (Room E)

Organizers: Nax Heinrich, Grant Schoenebeck

Design of Online Platforms: Frontiers and Challenges (Plenary Room + Room A)

Organizers: Daniela Saban, Laura Doval, Ozan Candogan

Events take place in Plenary Room until 3PM ET. After that, parallel sessions take place in both Plenary Room + Room A.

Operations of people-centric systems (Room B)

Organizers: Nikhil Garg, Vijay Kamble, Vahideh Manshadi

Workshop on Fair Resource Allocation: Concepts, Algorithms and Complexity (FaiRACAC) (Room C)

Organizers: Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris

INFORMS Market Design Workshop (Room D)

Organizers: Saša Pekec, Martin Bichler, Alex Teytelboym